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ABSTRACT 
This article is on the hidden state interest that article 52(§1) of 
the Chinese Contract Law protects and the questionable 
applicability of freedom of contract to Chinese state-owned 
enterprises (hereafter “SOEs”). In common law, fraud and duress 
make a contract voidable. In Western civil law jurisdictions, 
including Louisiana, fraud and duress make a contract relatively 
null. Article 52(§1) of the Chinese Contract Law renders a contract 
induced by fraud and duress absolutely null (null and void if using 
common law terminology) when state interest is harmed. At the 
same time, according to article 54 of the Contract Law, fraud and 
duress only make a contract relatively null just like in Western 
laws. The situation is further complicated by article 58 of General 
Principles of Civil Law (hereinafter “G.P.C.L.”), which renders all 
civil juristic acts absolutely null when induced by fraud and duress. 
To understand when a contract is null or annullable one has to 
reconcile these three statutory provisions and figure out what the 
state interest article 52(1) refers to. This article attempts to 
demystify this state interest through a historical survey of the 
evolution of contract law in the communist regime in China in 
comparison with the similar path Soviet civil law had gone 
through. If it simply means public interest, Chinese law is no 
different than the western counterparts. If it means something 
different, a secretive enlarged state power to declare nullity and 
invade freedom of contract might come with this law. Given the 
principal-agent relationship between the state and SOEs regarding 
the ownership rights of SOE assets, the absence of a sufficiently 
competitive market, the incentive incompatibility between the state 
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and SOEs, an enlarged state power over contractual autonomy is 
therefore implied and justified. This article suggests that such a 
state interest be state-owned enterprises’ financial interest, which 
is different from public interest. As a result, freedom of contract 
shall not be applicable to Chinese SOEs when ownership rights 
and a competitive market are missing, and a different interpretation 
of nullity law should be adopted to protect SOEs’ financial 
interest. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Western civil law jurisdictions, a contract that violates the 
law, public policy or morality is absolutely null.1 A contract that 
was entered into through fraud or duress is relatively null:2 it is 
valid unless the victim of the wrongdoing asks to have it annulled.3 
There is good reason for the distinction. If a contract violates the 
law, public policy or morality, it should not be valid whether the 
parties wish it to be or not. If a contract is induced by fraud or 
 1.  See K. ZWEIGERT & H. KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE 
LAW 381 (3d ed., Tony Weir trans., Oxford 1998). 
 2. There is a conceptual difference between common law and civil law that 
can be reflected in the choice of terminology between voidable and relatively 
null. Common law contract law concerns the enforceability of a promise and the 
voidability of the contract is raised by the promisor as a defense to bar the 
enforcement of a promise. In civil law, a relatively null contract is valid until 
declared null by a court upon the request of the aggrieved party. China adopted 
the civil law approach and requires, when certain circumstances warrant a 
revocable contract, the aggrieved party to request the court to have a contract 
annulled or revoked. See Chinese Contract Law art. 54. Therefore, in this article, 
I refer to contracts induced by fraud and duress as “relatively null contracts” in 
conformity with the civil law tradition. Also, as appeared in the official 
translation of Chinese contract law, the term “null and void” was adopted to 
correspond to the concept of “absolutely nullity” in the mainstream civil law. In 
this article, I will quote the term “null and void” in reference to “absolutely 
null”. The contracts that are relatively null are phrased literally as “revocable 
and modifiable” contracts in Chinese statutes. Chinese law gives the aggrieved 
party not only the option to nullify such contracts as they are “revocable”, but 
also the power to modify the contract if they can reach agreement with the party 
at fault.  
 3.  For example, under German law, a declaration of intention that is 
induced by fraud or duress, and therefore not genuine, is only voidable. See 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] art. 123 (Ger.). Under French law, 
error, violence, and deceit are vices to consent, making the contract relatively 
null. See Code civil [C. CIV.] art. 1109, 1110, 1113, 1116 (Fr.). 
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duress, it should be valid only if the victim so chooses. A buyer 
may have been fraudulently induced to pay 100 for goods with a 
market value of 80. In this case, he should be able to withdraw 
from the contract and get restitution damage- return the goods and 
get the 100 back. But, if the market price suddenly jumped to 120, 
he should be able to enforce it. He should also be able to enforce it 
if the goods are unique and worth more than 100 to him personally.  
When relative nullity exists, why should the law allow the 
aggrieved party to determine the validity of the contract rather than 
declare the contract null and void ab initio? Clear classification of 
nullities had not been achieved by Roman law.4 The modern 
classification of nullities and the widespread recognition of relative 
nullity in the civil law world owes to the rise of freedom of 
contract and will theories as a result of the 19th century liberalism 
and laissez-faire capitalism.5 The reasoning behind relative nullity 
is usually that party will know his own interest better than the court 
and courts shall not interfere with contracting parties’ free will, as 
dictated by the principle of freedom of contract. The wills of the 
contracting parties and their consent that relative nullity law tries 
to protect were not the central theme of contract law before the 
19th century. However, since the rise of will theories and freedom 
of contract, the classical contract theory has “the tendency to 
attribute all the consequences of a contract to the will of those who 
made it.”6 As a result, “the primary function of the contract came 
to be seen as purely facultative, and the function of the court was 
merely to resolve a dispute by working out the implications of 
what the parties had already chosen to do.”7 
 4. The detailed accounts of the historical confusions can be seen in 
REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF 
THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 679 (1990); see also Ronald J. Scalise Jr., Rethinking 
the Doctrine of Nullity, 74 LA. L. REV. 665 (2014). 
 5. The relevant provisions in French Civil Code are a typical product of 
this movement. See supra note 2. 
 6. P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 404 
(Oxford 1979). 
 7. Id. at 408. 
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The core of freedom of contract is to give binding force to 
whatever is mutually agreed between the contracting parties.8 
Thus, to ensure freedom of bargaining, which was regarded as “the 
fundamental and indispensable requisite of progress”9 by the 19th 
century economists, courts shall not step in to rectify an unfair 
bargain “since the force of competition will ensure fairness in 
terms and prices.”10  
When the vice of consent in a contract only affects the interest 
of the contracting parties, nullity of contract can only be asserted 
by the party shouldering the negative consequence of this defect. 
The aggrieved parties are the only class of people the law of 
relative nullity is trying to protect, and the law gives them the 
option to confirm the act. Whenever they decide to confirm the 
validity of a defective contract that does not impair public or bona 
fide third party’s interest, they are acting in their own interest, and 
they are in a better position than the court to estimate the 
consequence of annulling a contract for themselves. In addition to 
protecting freedom of contract, the rules of relative nullity also 
operate to guarantee the safety of transactions. They give an 
incentive for parties to engage in business transactions by assuring 
them of their power to rescind the contract on their own initiative 
barring circumstances where the contractual defects will interfere 
with the interest of the public or a third party. 
The unrestricted role the rise of capitalism and 19th century 
liberalism placed on the will has undoubtedly declined as so 
declared by Gilmore and Atiyah.11 According to them, the destiny 
 8. Article 1134 of the French Civil Code describes this principle as such: 
“contracts legally formed have the force of law for the parties who made them.” 
Chinese law adopted the idea of contractual freedom for the first time in 1999 
through art. 4 of the Contract Law: “The parties have the right to lawfully enter 
into a contract of their own free will in accordance with the law, and no unit or 
individual may illegally interfere therewith.” 
 9. JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT 
DOCTRINE 214 (Oxford 1991). 
 10. ATIYAH, supra note 6, at 405. 
 11. See generally GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (Ohio State 
Univ. Press, 1974); ATIYAH, supra note 6.  
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of freedom of contract is closely related to that of general theories 
of contract law, and neither of the two existed before the 19th 
century. The role of freedom of contract has been declining when 
the dominant role of the general theory of contract was gradually 
taken over bit by bit by the rise of protection of consumer interests 
in transactions where the bargaining powers are extremely 
unequal, limitations placed by special contracts such as the 
adhesion contracts, the emergence of regulatory law, and 
sophisticated commercial contracts that will allow parties to opt 
out of the requirements what freedom of contract would expect. 
Still, in the west as in most parts of the world, freedom of contract 
as a doctrine survived these attacks and is widely respected outside 
the particular areas of the contract law mentioned above. 
Nevertheless, contract law certainly predates capitalism and 
will theories and principles such as equality in exchange, 
commutative justice, and fairness guided contractual transactions 
in pre-commercial societies and post commercial but pre-capitalist 
civil law without the will theories.12 With all the difficulties and 
discredits mentioned earlier, does every industrialized society have 
to have contract theories that are based solely on the will and 
autonomy? Shall freedom of contract be applied to all human 
societies regardless of any features in its economy or are there 
certain prerequisites a society must entail for this doctrine to be 
justified and therefore become desirable?  
This investigation on the relative nullity of contract in Chinese 
law serves as a test to examine whether freedom of contract, 
borrowed from the West and recognized as a fundamental principle 
of Chinese contract law, should be preconditioned on certain 
prerequisites such as the existence of private ownership and the 
availability of a competitive market. More specifically, I hope to 
test whether freedom of contract is applicable to Chinese state-
 12. See generally James Gordley, Contract in Pre-Commercial Societies 
and in Western History in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE 
LAW (J.C.B. Mohr ed., 1997). 
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owned enterprises (SOEs) by investigating whether Chinese SOEs 
are afforded the option the relative nullity law provides 
theoretically to all contracting parties. I am of the opinion that, if 
freedom of contract is not applicable to China or Chinese SOEs, it 
is only reasonable that a different kind of relative nullity law 
should be adopted in China to serve the economic features unique 
to China. 
In China, given the nuances arising from the inner-
consistencies of various statutory provisions, the question whether 
a contract is absolutely null or relatively null is unclear.13 At first 
sight, the law seems contradictory. Contracts are governed by the 
Contract Law enacted in 1999. Article 54 provides that, as in 
Western jurisdictions, a party who was induced to enter a contract 
by fraud or duress may have it annulled or modified. Article 52 
provides that a contact is “null and void” if it “is concluded 
through the use of fraud or coercion by one party to damage the 
interests of the State” (§1); if it “harms the public interest” (§4); or 
if it “violates the compulsory provisions of the laws and 
administrative regulations” (§5).  
If article 52 merely meant that a contract is null and void when 
it is illegal or offends public policy or morality, Chinese law would 
 13. Western civil law scholars have raised the possibility of adding a third 
category of nullity, namely, mixed nullity for civil juristic acts or contracts that 
do not fit neatly within the traditional dichotomy of nullity. See Scalise, supra 
note 4. In determining the validity of contract or civil juristic act, Chinese law 
does introduce a third category: effect-to-be-determined contract or act, to put 
the legal effect of a contract or civil juristic act entered with inadequate civil 
capacity on hold pending on the confirmation or denial of the party with 
adequate capacity. The most relevant example is that a joint venture agreement 
between a Chinese domestic enterprise and a foreign enterprise is subject to state 
approval. Before such approval, the agreement is considered neither a valid nor 
an invalid contract. This situation is common in foreign investment transactions 
where thestate will have paternalistic power over the validity of the contract. For 
example, in the United States, the President has the power to suspend or prohibit 
foreign acquisitions on the grounds of national security. See 50 U.S.C. app. 
§2170(d). This article focuses solely on the tension between relative and 
absolute nullity under Chinese law, and therefore consciously avoids the 
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be like that of Western jurisdictions. In the case of fraud or duress, 
a contract would be relatively null at the instance of the wronged 
party. In the instance of illegality or immorality, the contract would 
be absolutely null. But then there would have been no need for the 
statute to provide that a contract is absolutely null, not only when it 
violates the law, but when “the use of fraud and duress damage the 
interest of the state” (§1) or “malicious collusion committed to 
harm the state interest” when the contract neither “harms the public 
interest” (§4) nor violates any “laws” or “administrative 
regulations” (§5). 
Suppose, however, that all contracts were deemed to affect the 
“interest of the state” or the “public interest.” As we will see, that 
was the official view before the introduction of elements of market 
economy in China. To the extent that view still prevails, every 
interference with the contracting by fraud and duress would 
“damage the interest of the state.” All contracts entered into by 
fraud or duress would be absolutely null under article 52(§1). But 
then, article 52(§1) would conflict with article 54, which provides 
that contracts are annullable for fraud and duress, yet only at the 
instance of the wronged party.  
The law on the nullification of contracts induced by fraud or 
duress has been further complicated by article 58(§3) of the 
G.P.C.L.,14 which was enacted in 1986 to provide general 
 14. Article 58 of the General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (GPCL—Adopted April 12th, 1986 and Effective January 
1st, 1987) provides that: 
 Civil juristic acts in the following categories shall be null and void: 
(1) those performed by a person without legal capacity for civil 
conduct; 
(2) those that according to law may not be independently performed by 
a person with limited capacity for civil conduct; 
(3) those performed by a person against his true intentions as a result of 
fraud, duress or exploitation of his unfavorable position by the other 
party; 
(4) those performed through malicious collusion are detrimental to the 
interest of the state, a collective or a third party; 
(5) those that violate the law or the public interest; 
(6) economic contracts that violate the state's mandatory plans; and 
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provisions that were intended to operate as the Book I of the future 
Chinese Civil Code. Contract is regarded as a subcategory of “civil 
juristic acts” (Rechtsgeschäft) in civil law jurisprudence. Article 58 
lists all the circumstances where a civil juristic act is deemed null 
and void. This laundry list covers all the circumstances under both 
article 52 and article 54 of the 1999 Contract Law without 
recognizing annullable civil acts. Under article 58(§3), a civil 
juristic act is null and void when a manifestation of intent is 
violated by fraud, duress and exploitation of the victim’s 
unfavorable position. The literal interpretation of this article would 
possibly mean fraud and duress will make a civil juristic act 
absolutely null regardless of whether the state interest is harmed, 
which conflicts with the two Contract Law articles mentioned 
above.  
Perhaps, the most direct and effective way to assess the 
situation is to examine how courts interpret this provision in 
practice. However, this was not feasible until very recently. For 
many years, Chinese cases had not been available and accessible to 
general public and even the practitioners. In fact, most judicial 
opinions had been regarded as state secrets and made available 
only to the parties and court personnel. Only in the past few years 
had the newly-established search engines and legal research 
database started providing a select amount of cases to the public. 
For this project, up until the summer of 2013, I was only able to 
locate 23 cases decided under article 52 but none of the cases cited 
article 52(§1). In spring 2014, with more cases becoming 
accessible from the databases, I have identified 99 cases that cited 
article 52(§1). Through all these cases, one can easily detect the 
fact that courts are splitting on two issues: whether the state 
(7) those performed under the guise of legitimate acts conceal 
illegitimate purposes. 
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interest here is equivalent to public interest or the SOE’s interest; if 
and when state interest really means SOEs’ interest, whether SOEs 
are afforded the option to keep the contract when there is a defect 
in consent induced by fraud or duress. I would like to suggest that 
such a hidden interest be the financial interest of SOEs that is 
different from public interest or any other interest law or public 
policy should protect in a market economy. Nevertheless, such 
interest should be otherwise protected given the absence of a 
sufficiently competitive market, and incentive incompatibility 
between the state as the owner of state assets and SOEs as the 
agents of the state. Also, I would like to argue that state should 
only exercise this enlarged power to declare the nullity of contract 
on the court’s own initiative when there is neglect of duty, where 
the situation warrants no reasonable ground to justify the SOE 
management’s failure to revoke the contract – the option afforded 
by article 54.  
Determining which contracts are relatively null and which are 
absolutely null under Chinese law is not simply a matter of 
reconciling the three statutory provisions. It is a matter of 
reconciling the role of the state and the role of contracting parties 
in an economy which is in part state managed and in part market 
driven. To understand such a battle over contract autonomy, one 
has first to figure out what this secret state interest the Chinese 
laws are trying so hard to protect is. To see what is at stake, one 
must consider the role that contract and contract law played before 
and after private markets were introduced in the communist China. 
II. CONTRACT LAW UNDER THE COMMUNIST REGIME 
A. 1950-1981: The Total Denial of Private Law and Freedom of 
Contract 
1. The Economic Logic behind Nationalization 
Upon the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 
1949, private ownership of land and industry was gradually 
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eliminated in order to implement the heavy industry oriented 
economic strategy. Following the massive nationalization of 
industry and commerce and the establishment of the state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), a free and competitive market was gone and 
the price distortion emerged to artificially lower the cost in 
developing heavy industry. Such price distortion made it 
impossible for the state to evaluate the SOEs’ management 
performance by using profit rate as the primary indicator, as it has 
been used in a market economy. Under these circumstances, 
without an effective governance model, the incentive 
incompatibility and information asymmetry between state and 
SOEs would not permit SOEs to have either the autonomy or 
business incentive in contracting.  
The fact that communist China was founded upon a low level 
of industrialization and a backward economic structure made the 
government designate the development of heavy industry a 
priority, especially given the economic embargo due to the 
international disapproval of the new government and military 
threats China faced at the time.15 
The profit generated by the same capital in light industry was 
270% of that generated in heavy industry in 1957.16 If given a 
choice, private investors likely had much less incentive to invest in 
heavy industry, therefore not meeting state expectations. 
Therefore, the nationalization of heavy industry and the 
replacement of privately-owned enterprises with SOEs became the 
alternative. Also, in order to reduce the production costs of heavy 
industry, it was essential to bring down the living costs of 
industrial workers.17 Given the fact that private investors would 
have had no incentive to invest if the prices had to be distorted to 
serve the heavy industry, light industry was also nationalized.18 
 15. See JUSTIN YIFU LIN, FANG CAI & ZHOU LI, CHINESE STATE-OWNED 
ENTERPRISES REFORM 23 (The Chinese Univ. Press 2001) 
 16. See id. at 23. 
 17. See id. at 24. 
 18. See id. 
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Following nationalizations, prices were distorted. A 
competitive and free market was no longer available. The 
implementation of state economic plans was considered the top 
priority for SOEs rather than profit maximization. All this 
appeared to be reasonable, since in a highly centrally planned 
economy, both profits and deficits can be artificially attributed to a 
particular industrial sector or a monopolized enterprise with the 
purpose of achieving the government’s economic agenda. In such 
an economy, profit can no longer serve as an indicator in the 
evaluation of the business performance of SOEs.19 When the 
market was gone, so was market competition. Without market 
competition, SOEs acted as monopolies in their designated regions. 
Profits and deficits can be easily manipulated by the state’s 
decisions in price setting, prioritizing the development of an 
industry, or the manufacturing of certain products. It followed that 
the incentive to maximize profits should not even be permissible 
for the fear that SOE managers might try to intercept the 
production residuals at the expense of the implementation of state 
economic plans.20 Nevertheless, the incentive incompatibility 
between the state as the owner of the state assets and SOEs as the 
managers of the state assets still existed. To protect the state from 
managers intercepting industrial residues and misappropriating 
state-owned assets, and to supply the lack of sufficient information 
in evaluating enterprise performance, it was required that the state 
be deeply involved in the daily operation of SOEs, which further 
took away the business autonomy and incentive of SOEs.  
In the rural areas, the land reform took place which allowed the 
peasants to take over land from the landlords by force rather than 
by law or administrative decrees. Land ownership was since then 
monopolized by state and village collectives. Socialist agricultural 
communes were established in 1958 upon the enactment of the 
Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the 
 19. See id. at 116. 
 20. See id. 
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Communist Party to bring about the agricultural collectivization 
and state monopoly of crops. The commune supplied all the 
economic resources and means of production equally to its 
members for free.  
As a result of the ownership reform, the only type of ownership 
desired and allowed in the country’s economy was public 
ownership.21 
When private ownership disappeared in industry and 
commerce, and freedom of contract was completely taken away 
from enterprises, contract law was no longer considered private 
law and contracting became a mere documentation of state 
economic plans.  
Together with nationalization and as part of its ideological 
campaign, the Chinese Communist Party followed the Soviet 
Union’s experience in “casting out all prerevolutionary law” in 
order to “create a new heaven and a new earth.”22 As a result, all 
pre-existing laws enacted by the Nationalist Government such as 
the Civil Code were regarded as evil and something to be 
eliminated.23 Both private economy and private contractual 
transactions lost legal legitimacy. With contracting parties losing 
all financial incentive to enforce a contract, nullification was no 
longer an issue. As a result, contracts other than economic 
contracts were either not regulated by law or outlawed entirely. 
The Chinese economic system in this period of time imitated the 
militant commune system operated in Soviet Union from 1918 to 
1921 when private ownership and contract rights had been totally 
denied. The later Chinese economic reform resembles the New 
Economic Policy adopted by Soviet Union after the failure of the 
militant commune system. During both reforms, private ownership 
 21. Of course, private ownership had to still exist in reality, especially when 
it came to personal property.  
 22. See JEROME ALAN COHEN, CONTEMPORARY CHINESE LAW: RESEARCH 
PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 324 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1970). 
 23. See MO ZHANG, CHINESE CONTRACT LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 2 
(Martinus Nijhoff Pubs. 2006).  
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and private market were reintroduced along with the resurrection 
of legal institutions based on the civilian tradition. However, much 
like what happened later in China, the Soviet Union continued to 
exercise a central control over the economy and retained extensive 
powers to protect the state financial interest in the economy, 
thereby largely interfering with freedom of contract.  
2. Militant Communism in the Soviet Union  
Militant Communism was a period of time from 1917 to 1921 
when the Soviet government was fighting the civil war against its 
domestic opponents and foreign intervention. During this period of 
time, the Soviet government established a communist social order 
through massive collectivization and attempted to use central 
economic planning to replace markets.24 
A series of fundamental legal and institutional changes began 
in 1918 that allowed the government to be the “exclusive owner of 
land, industrial and commercial establishments, and the only 
producer and distributor of commodities”.25 The Soviet Union 
proclaimed its status as a communist country and at the same time 
destroyed the legality of private ownership. The right to contract 
disappeared along with property rights.  
On November 30th, 1918, the Statute on the Judiciary 
abrogated all older laws.26 On February 19th of the same year, all 
private land ownership was abolished.27 Transactions regarding the 
right to use land were also prohibited.28 Massive confiscations and 
nationalization took place. In 1918, several decrees annulled 
inheritance rights, stocks, bonds, and confiscated savings.29 
Banking, insurance and foreign trade were also subject to 
 24. See VLADMIR GSOVSKI, SOVIET CIVIL LAW 10 (Univ. of Michigan Press 
1946). 
 25. Id.  
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. at 10. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
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government monopolies.30 By June 1919, copyrights and patents 
became subject to government monopoly.31 
The government ownership of land and monopoly of crops and 
grains was enforced through the establishment of socialist 
agriculture communes. Special military detachments were sent to 
villages to collect the crops.32 Peasants could only keep the crops 
and grains needed for their bare consumption. The surpluses above 
those needed for consumption had to be delivered to the 
government at “fixed prices equal to confiscation”.33 All private 
trade in food was forbidden.34  
The Supreme Economic Council was established in 1917 to 
manage all the state owned enterprises and confiscate private 
enterprises. In 1920, in order to inhibit the undesirable growth of 
the private businesses, the council issued an order nationalizing 
“all industrial establishments employing ten or more workers, or 
even five or more workers if with motorized installations.”35 
Following the massive confiscation and governmental regulations, 
from 1918 to 1920, all business initiatives were barred as were 
private property rights.  
Soon enough, the omnipotent state role replaced the private law 
and the rigorous state planning left no place for contracting.  
According to Goikhbarg, private law such as contract law was 
almost entirely absent during the period of militant communism 
with one exception, the contract of a village with the shepherd of 
the community herd.36 
In 1921, a famine ended militant communism. The New 
Economic Policy was introduced and a Russian Soviet Federative 
 30. Id. 
 31. November 26, 1918, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic 
(R.S.F.S.R.) Laws 1918, text 900. 
 32. April 22, 1918, R.S.F.S.R. Laws 1918, text 432; June 11, 1920, 
R.S.F.S.R. Laws 1920, text 295; March 13, 1922, R.S.F.S.R. Laws 1922, text 
266. 
 33. R.S.F.S.R. Laws 1917–1918, text 468.  
 34. R.S.F.S.R. Laws 1917–1918, text 346, §19.  
 35. R.S.F.S.R. Laws 1920, text 512, §546.  
 36. See GSOVKI, supra note 24. 
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Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) Civil Code was enacted in 1922, 
heavily influenced by the German Civil Code. Starting in May 
1922, some confiscated properties were returned to former 
owners.37 Any new confiscation was prohibited for the future.38 
3. The Total Denial of Private Ownership and Contract Law as 
Private Law in China  
As had happened in the Soviet Union after 1917, rigid state 
planning took place in China in the 1950s, leaving no place for 
autonomy in contracting.  
As in the Soviet Union, given the fact that all means of 
production were now controlled by the government on behalf of 
every citizen, the only legally permissible contracts became 
economic contracts. As a consequence, only SOEs and government 
organs were allowed to contract.39  
Nevertheless, the nationalization of means of production and 
private ownership along with the repudiation of all preexisting 
contract laws did not mean that no rules were in place to regulate 
contracts. It is said that, “up to 1958, 66% of 4000 regulations 
dealt with the national economy.”40 Most remaining laws 
regulating contract were provisional decrees that were enacted to 
implement the state economic plans.41 For example, contracting 
was regulated by Provisional Methods on Contractual Agreement 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See the Administration Council Commission of Finance and Economy, 
Provisional Methods on Contractual Agreement Made between Government 
Agencies, State Enterprises, and Cooperatives arts. 2–5 (1950), See MO ZHANG, 
supra note 23, at 3. 
 40. Gene T. Hsiao, The Role of Economic Contracts in Communist China, 
53 CAL. L. REV. 1029 (1965). 
 41. The author is not arguing that there were no customs or informal local 
rules that might have been dealing with contracts in the civil law sense in 
Chinese society. However, whatever informal rules and dispute resolution 
mechanisms that might have been available before the economic reform at the 
end of 1970s, they were unofficial rules not recognized by the state and the 
activities that they dealt with were not regarded as contracting by the state until 
1999 when contract law was finally defined as civil law.  
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Made between Government Agencies, State Enterprises, and 
Cooperatives (hereinafter “Provisional Methods”), which was 
issued in 1950 by the Commission of Finance and Economy under 
State Council (the equivalent of the Supreme Economic Council in 
the Soviet Union).42 In 1963, the Commission on Finance and 
Economy issued another administrative regulation titled Tentative 
Methods Regarding Mining Products Ordering Contracts 
(hereinafter “Tentative Methods”). Other Ordering Contract 
Regulations were issued during this period. 
Under the Provisional Methods, a contract was an economic act 
subject to state control.43 The aim of such contracting activity was 
to distribute the resources and products according to rigid state 
economic plans and to satisfy every citizen’s quota. This is akin to 
a system in which the state is a big company that employs every 
citizen and everyone lives for free without drawing a salary.  
During this so-called “lawless” era, the validity of contract was 
not even a practical legal issue and was never worth fighting for. 
Therefore, there was no mention of the nullity of contract in the 
Provisional Methods and Tentative Methods. The purpose of 
contracting was to “ensure the conscientious implementation and 
all-around fulfillment of the state plan.”44 In accordance with this 
principle, parties entered into contracts not to maximize their 
profits but to serve the state interest. No legal rights were vested in 
the hands of contracting parties. It can be inferred that no contract 
could be entered into except to carry out the state economic plan. 
In such a context, it made sense that parties would not have to bear 
the risk of financial loss. Actually, at that time, all businesses were 
owned by the state, which provided 100% of the enterprise 
 42. See MO ZHANG, supra note 23, at 3.  
 43. See id.  
 44. See the Administration Council Commission on Finance and Economy, 
Tentative Methods Regarding Mining Products Ordering Contracts art. 2 (1963). 
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equity.45 Each individual business entity had neither an 
independent budget nor independent financial status.46  
As Pitman B. Potter described: 
Enterprise budgets were fixed and were generally 
unaffected by the nonfulfillment of contracts. Enterprise 
managers bore very little responsibility for losses caused by 
nonperformance of contracts, since such losses were 
generally made up by the state, either through an 
adjustment of the aggrieved party’s planned production 
quota or by directly absorbing the deficit suffered by the 
aggrieved party.47  
Under the 1950 Regulations, all contracts had to be registered 
at the People’s Banks,48 if the payment could not be processed 
immediately, and contracts, upon conclusion, had to be filed with 
the superior government and its economic commission, and also 
filed in the record of the department of treasury.49 Compulsory 
dispute resolution mechanisms were in place before a contract 
dispute could be adjudicated by a court. Disputes regarding to 
nonperformance or breach of contract would have to be first 
submitted to a higher governmental authority for mediation since 
all businesses were owned by the state, and operated in the same 
way as a government agency.  
If both parties were from the same province or circuit, their 
disputes had to be submitted to the higher level government’s 
economic commission.50 If the parties were from different 
provinces or circuits, the disputes had to be submitted to the 
 45. Capital structure of SOEs include 100% of state equity and zero debt. 
See JIAN CHEN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 52 (Routledge 2005). 
 46. See PITMAN B. POTTER, THE ECONOMIC CONTRACT LAW OF CHINA, 
LEGITIMATION AND CONTRACT AUTONOMY IN THE PRC 32 (Univ. of 
Washington Press 1992). 
 47. Id. at 27. 
 48. The People’s Bank is the central bank of China and the regulatory body 
of China’s financial institutions.  
 49. Provisional Methods on Contractual Agreement Made between 
Government Agencies, State Enterprises, and Cooperatives art. 10 (1950).  
 50. See id. at art. 10. 
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economic commission under the central government.51 A suit 
could only be filed in court when such arbitration or mediation 
from the higher authority could not solve the disputes.52 Even 
when a suit was eventually filed in court, it would probably not 
concern the validity of contract. At first, government-run 
businesses had no concern whether a contract had been concluded 
legally, and whether the parties’ declaration of intention was 
genuine. Since contracting was merely a form for recording state 
economic plans, contracting parties signed contacts simply to 
implement the executive order from higher government authorities, 
which excluded any autonomous intention on the part of the 
parties. Therefore, vices of consent, such as fraud and duress, as 
understood in Western law, did not really violate a contracting 
party’s consent. Moreover, even if fraud and duress did violate one 
contracting party’s financial interest, the loss suffered by the 
innocent party would be borne by the state and the unjust 
enrichment that resulted would also be absorbed by the state.  
The major dispute a court might be dealing with in that time 
would be the failure to perform a contract. When this happened, a 
contracting party could not choose the form of remedy, and no 
monetary damages were available. The primary remedy was 
always specific performance.53 When there was a late delivery, the 
remedy would probably “take the form of an apology and a 
promise to deliver as soon as possible.”54 
Therefore, from 1950–1981, Chinese contract law was pure 
public law. The Western idea of freedom of contract, which is 
based on theories of will and the declaration of will, was not even 
remotely applicable in China.55 If German contract law can be 
 51. See id. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See POTTER, supra note 46, at 42. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 1, at 326. 
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criticized for “containing only a few drops of social oil,”56 Chinese 
law, at that time, could be said to contain nothing but “social oil.” 
4. 1981–1999: Fraud and Duress Make a Contract Null and 
Void 
The Third Plenary Session of the 11th Communist Party of 
China Central Committee Meeting, held in 1978, changed the 
direction of Chinese economy. The “Reforming and Opening Up” 
policy was adopted at this meeting. The lawless era ended as soon 
as China reopened its door to the world in 1979. The first contract 
law statute, called Economic Contract Law (E.C.L.), was drafted in 
1980 and became effective in 1981. The E.C.L. was the law that 
governed domestic contracts. Another statute, the Foreign 
Economic Contract Law, was enacted to regulate contracts entered 
into with foreign parties. A third statute, the Technology Contract 
Law, was also adopted to govern technology related contracts. The 
concepts of private ownership and private economy were no longer 
prohibited and were reintroduced as “a supplement to the socialist 
economy”.57 As a summary of the previous administrative 
regulations, the E.C.L. was an essential component to carry out the 
rigid state economic plan while at the same time allowing the 
increased autonomy that an open market and private ownership 
economy required. The E.C.L. was enacted with the purpose of 
“ensuring the fulfillment of state plans.”58 Further, following this 
non-civil law definition, the E.C.L. allowed only legal persons to 
be the parties to an economic contract.59 Under this article, 
economic contracts were defined as “agreements between legal 
entities for the purpose of realizing certain economic goals and 
specifying each other's rights and obligations.”60 While 
maintaining the concern with economic law, certain features of 
 56. See BASIL S. MARKESINIS, GERMAN LAW OF CONTRACT 45 (Hart 2006). 
 57. See Constitution of the People’s Republic of China art. 11. 
 58. See Economic Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China art.1  
 59. See id. art. 2. 
 60. Id. 
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civil law emerged for the first time in the legislative history of the 
People’s Republic of China. The contracting party, for the first 
time, had a lawful interest in contracting61 and contracting parties’ 
autonomy in contracting was recognized and protected.62 Along 
with increased autonomy, enterprises began to have independent 
financial status and to bear contractual liabilities. Still, by the time 
of the E.C.L.’s enactment, the effect of a planned economy was 
dominant and the hard-won autonomy was very limited. The state 
was still responsible for setting the market prices for products 
according to planning. According to the E.C.L., the contract price 
could only be negotiated when the state policy permits.63 
As a result, the concept of the nullification of contract was 
introduced for the first time. The E.C.L., however, did not 
distinguish relatively null contracts from absolutely null contracts. 
It annulled the contracts that might be deemed relatively null under 
French and German law.64 According to the E.C.L., all the 
following contracts are deemed null and void:  
(1) contracts in violation of the law or state policies and plans; 
(2) contracts signed through the use of fraud, coercion or similar 
means; 
(3) contracts signed by an agent beyond the scope of his power of 
agency, or contracts signed by an agent in the name of his principal 
with himself or with another person whom he represents; and 
(4) economic contracts infringing on the interests of the state or the 
public interest.65 
The striking effect of this article was that violation of state 
plans was one of the grounds to rescind contracts, and the 
 61. Id. art. 1. 
 62. Id. art. 5. This article provides: “Economic contracts must be made 
according to the principles of equality and mutual benefit, agreement through 
consultation and compensation of equal value. Neither party is allowed to 
impose its will on the other, and no unit or individual is allowed to interfere 
illegally.” 
 63. Id. at art. 17(3), art. 23. Prices for both sales and lease contracts can be 
negotiated by parties when prices are not set by the State. 
 64. See id. art. 7.  
 65. Id. at art. 7. 
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existence of fraud and duress made a contract absolutely null rather 
than relatively null. Also, acting beyond the scope of authority 
rendered a contract null without recognizing later ratification by 
the principal as a cure for nullity. This clear cut solution as to 
defective contract was a reflection of the strong sense of protection 
of state economic interest under which the protection of private 
parties’ interest was secondary. By this time, freedom of contract 
was not yet introduced. Also, protecting the safety of transaction 
and bona fide third party were significantly outweighed by 
safeguarding the state interest.  
Though state control had been somewhat relaxed to leave room 
for a private economy and private market, the planned economy 
remained dominant. It might sound unsophisticated, by modern 
continental civil law standards, to deprive the parties from contract 
autonomy and to regard all annullable contracts as already null and 
void. Nevertheless, it was an understandable result given the 
historical context in China at that time in which the state had to 
intervene and declare a contract null when the majority of legal 
persons, as SOEs, didn’t have contractual autonomy and business 
incentive to enforce their contractual rights on behalf of the state.  
In the early stage of the economic reform, the state’s financial 
interest in carrying out the economic plans without interference by 
fraud and duress was superior to the protection of the small scale 
privately owned enterprises’ business autonomy in deciding 
whether to annul a contract when their consent was violated. After 
all, the overriding purpose of contracting was to meet the needs of 
the production and business operation under the mandate of the 
state plans.66 Many times, contracts had to be concluded under the 
quota provided by the state and the conclusion of the contract had 
to be authorized by a higher government authority.67  
 66. See MO ZHANG, supra note 23, at 32 (Quoting SU HUIXIANG, THEORY 
OF ECONOMIC CONTRACT LAW 3–5 (Liaoning People’s Press 1990)). 
 67. See id. at 48. This situation happens when the business transactions 
concerning products and items fall within the scope of state mandatory plans. 
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On the other hand, in contrast to the West, where contracting is 
a result of business judgment, the majority of the contracting 
parties in China were simply carrying out the daily tasks assigned 
by higher authorities. Therefore, it made sense to consider fraud 
and duress as offenses to public policy and harms to public 
interest. In Western law, contracts in violation of public policy or 
morality are universally regarded as absolutely null or void. 
Moreover, given the fact that when the E.C.L. was enacted, 
virtually all business entities allowed to contract at that time were 
owned by the state, and consequently no private interest could 
have been harmed by the state intrusion in nullifying all contracts 
concluded by fraud and duress. At the beginning of the economic 
reform, private parties were simply not within the purview of the 
E.C.L.  
As a contract under the E.C.L. was not essentially a civil 
juristic act, and no private interest was involved, the only party 
bearing the loss caused by fraud and duress was the state. 
Therefore, it seemed reasonable for the state to interfere with the 
validity of all such contracts and to rescind them.  
5. 1993–1999: The Emergence of a Market Economy and the 
Obsolescence of the E.C.L. 
a. Emergence of Private Ownership  
Starting in 1980, a private economy first appeared among the 
peasants’ households when a land tenure system named the Land 
Contract Responsibility System was established. The state 
allocated the cultivated land to peasant families. Families, as the 
basic units, were responsible for producing a certain amount of 
grain according to their assigned quota. Farmers were also allowed 
to keep the surplus as their own when exceeding the quota. The 
emergence of surplus created trade markets within each village 
neighborhood that sold exclusively agricultural products. This 
reintroduction of private ownership gave the farmers an incentive 
to produce more. Private ownership was soon extended to urban 
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cities where privately owned business households were allowed to 
operate. Such business entities were owned by individuals and 
their families, without employees outside the family.68 This small-
scale business economy was favored by the Communist Party. A 
party policy would soon allow these privately owned businesses to 
hire employees, under the cover name of training “apprentices.”69 
However, according to an administrative decree issued by the State 
Council, the number of employees such privately owned 
businesses were allowed to hire could not exceed seven.70 This 
limit was placed to make sure that private business could only 
operate on a small scale so that state ownership would still be 
dominant and the foundation of communism would not be 
threatened. However, over the next few years, this restriction was 
not strictly enforced, and economy based on private ownership 
grew rapidly.  
b. State-Owned Enterprise Reform to Allow Autonomy and 
Incentives  
The state-owned enterprise reform in China differs from 
similar reforms in Eastern European and Latin American countries 
where massive privatization took place.71 The Chinese SOE reform 
has been mainly about allowing SOEs to acquire limited business 
autonomy and benefit from economic incentives rather than 
divesting SOEs and introducing a sufficiently competitive and free 
market. Admittedly, allowing economic motive improved SOE 
performance and efficiency, whilst a mere increase of autonomy 
and incentive does not guarantee the continued improvement of 
 68. In Marxism, capitalists, as business owners, obtain undue surpluses 
from the exploitation of their employees. Employment with private employers 
was deemed as an inherent feature in the capitalism that should not be allowed 
in communist China.  
 69. Implementing Rules on Urban Individual Business Households art. 4  
[城乡个体工商户管理条例Cheng Xiang Ge Ti Gong Shang Hu Guan Li Tiao 
Li]. 
 70. Id. 
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SOE performance.72 Moreover, the pre-existing incentive 
incompatibility and the information asymmetry between the state 
and SOEs were not effectively addressed in the economic reform. 
State interference with freedom of contract is still necessary to 
effectively prevent SOEs from maximizing their own interest that 
can be incompatible with the state economic goals. 
Following the expansion of autonomy in the privately-owned 
business, starting in 1984, a similar trend occurred among state-
owned enterprises as well. On May 10th, 1984, an administrative 
decree entitled “Provisional Regulations concerning the Expansion 
of Autonomy for State-owned Industrial Enterprises” was issued 
by the State Council. Several measures have been taken since then 
to allow more autonomy in the operation of state enterprises and to 
motivate employees. According to the decree, the SOEs were 
allowed to sell their above-quota production at their discretion and 
could even sell 2% of the planned production quota.73 For the 
goods at the SOEs’ disposal, SOEs can set the price within the 
range of 20% less to 20% above the state price.74 This was a 
change in the over-centralized price control in China. In 1979, 
there were 256 industrial products whose prices were subject to 
mandatory state planning.75 By 1984, this number was reduced to 
60.76 The trend has continued: the products whose prices are set by 
the state now account for only 5% of those in the market. 
 72. Behavioral studies have shown that performance is not always 
proportional to economic motive. And SOE reform in many other countries have 
reached the consensus that, besides improving incentive structure, successful 
SOE reforms also come with introducing competitive and free markets, toughen 
SOE financial budgets, and divestiture of SOE ownership, etc. See WORLD 
BANK, BUREAUCRATS IN BUSINESS, supra note 71, at 5. As a result, mere 
increase of incentive doesn’t lead to better performance of SOEs.  
 73. Provisional regulations concerning the expansion of autonomy for 
state-owned industrial enterprises (Quoted in SHAHID YUSUF, UNDER NEW 
OWNERSHIP: PRIVATIZING CHINA’S STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 56 (Stanford 
Univ. Press (2006)). 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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Another effort to motivate the SOE workers is to link their 
work performance with profits and abolish their employment 
tenure. The decree also allowed up to 3% of industrial workers to 
receive merit raises77 and by 1988, 60% of industrial workers were 
subjected to a wage scheme that links their salaries to the profits of 
the SOEs.78 Also, starting in 1986, a new system was adopted to 
deny life time employment to employees newly hired by the 
SOEs.79 
The business autonomy of SOEs was further promoted by the 
contract responsibility system, which was adopted in 1987.80 
Under this system, SOEs will sign a performance contract with the 
government, whose terms will extend for at least three years. These 
contracts were all written negotiated agreements specifying 
business goals for the SOEs to achieve within a given time 
frame.81 This scheme allows the SOEs to retain a large share of the 
profits and arrangements were made to divide the cash flow 
between the SOE and the government.82 
After over a decade of SOE reform, business autonomy greatly 
increased as a result, nevertheless, such autonomy was still limited 
and under the supervision of the state. As a survey conducted in 
1994 suggested, daily operational rights had been delegated to 
most of the SOEs while the autonomy to make major business 
decisions such as mergers and acquisitions, investment, authority 
to conduct international trade was reserved to a small percentage of 
the SOEs.83 According to this survey, 94% of the SOEs had 
acquired autonomous decision making rights of production and 
operation, 90.5% had acquired product sales rights, 95% acquired 
product sales right, 86% had acquired the wage and bonus 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 59. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See JUSTIN YIFU LIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 61. 
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allocation rights, 73.6% had acquired product pricing rights while 
on the other hand, only 25.8% of SOEs had acquired import and 
export rights, 46.6% had acquired asset disposing rights, 39.7% 
acquired the joint operation and acquisition rights.84 
Still, the benefits of the increased autonomy is limited by the 
facts that prices are still not completely determined by market, 
state policy burden and corporate social responsibility results in the 
overstaffing in virtually all SOE, which still hinder the efficiency 
of SOEs. Without a sufficiently free and competitive market in 
place, profit cannot serve as a sufficient information indicator of 
SOE performance. The budget constraints on SOEs are not hard 
enough and bank loans are still available upon request with interest 
rates well below the market rates even when the banks are well 
aware that this is risky lending. Moreover, the fact that the state 
was the only or majority shareholder made it impossible for these 
SOEs to adopt effective corporate governance structure.  
As a result, the increased autonomy of SOEs is still not the 
same as that of privately-owned enterprises in the West.  
c. Introduction of Socialist Market Economy  
To reflect and support these unstoppable changes in the 
country’s economic system, the concept of socialist market 
economy was introduced by the Party in 1993 at its 14th Central 
Committee Meeting. Since then, in theory, means of production 
and products should be now distributed by the market rather than 
state planning.  
As a result of these changes, a private interest now exists in the 
economic contracts, and privately-owned businesses have acquired 
the right to contract.  
To facilitate the transformation of a planned economy to 
market economy, the E.C.L. was amended in 1993; the Company 
 84. Id. (Quoting TAO SONG ET AL., MULTI-PERSPECTIVE THOUGHTS OF 40 
ECONOMISTS ON THE SOE REFORM 91). 
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Law of China was also adopted in the same year.85 The amended 
E.C.L. added peasant households and private-owned business 
households as parties who are allowed to enter into economic 
contracts.86 Also, in the amended article 7 of the E.C.L., violation 
of Communist Party economic policy was no longer a cause 
leading to nullity, which signified the end of planned economy. 
The then-newly enacted Company Law did not limit legal persons 
to SOEs and therefore opened the floodgate to allow privately-
owned enterprises to register as corporations and assume the status 
of legal persons.87  
The law regarding nullity remained unchanged, allowing the 
state to step in even in cases where there should be relative nullity 
and therefore a possibility of confirmation of the contract by the 
aggrieved party. This still allows the state to invade the contract 
autonomy.  
Now that private parties have the financial incentive in 
contracting, as in the West, when both parties to the contract are 
privately owned entities, this approach to invalidity can no longer 
be justified. As we have seen, the contract law of Western 
jurisdictions is based on the principle of freedom of contract. As 
noted in the Introduction, it allows the victim of fraud or duress to 
protect his own interest by choosing whether the contract will or 
will not be annulled. The privately-owned companies are legal 
persons who have stronger incentives to protect their own interests 
than the state. As such, they are in a better position to make 
decision as to whether a contract should be annulled.  
It is legitimate for the aggrieved party to have the option to 
exercise the right to rescission when only their interest will be 
affected by the decision. It is true that, in China, the majority of the 
economy is still government-owned, and that SOEs play a more 
 85. Before the promulgation of Company Law, there were two separate 
statutes dealing with state-owned enterprises and privately-owned enterprises 
separately. 
 86. See Economic Contract Law art. 2 (1993). 
 87. See Company Law of the People’s Republic of China arts. 2–3 (1993).  
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important role in the economy.88 Nevertheless, in a market 
economy, contractual autonomy should extend to them as well. 
The state-owned enterprises are no longer established for the sole 
purpose of implementing state policies. Most of them are for-profit 
and operate under the leadership of their own management rather 
than government authorities. Of course, the latter keep a 
supervising power over the management, through the authority of 
the State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC)89, various ministries and financial 
regulatory bodies. Still, they are market participants whose 
interests should receive only as much protection as private parties. 
It has been argued that, in the market economy, state-owned 
enterprises’ interests are not equivalent to state interest.90  
III. FROM 1999 TO THE PRESENT: CONTRACTS ANNULABLE FOR 
FRAUD AND DURESS WHEN NO STATE INTEREST IS INVOLVED 
A. Contract Law in General and the Invalidity of Contract  
In response to the rapid social and economic changes, the 
uniform Contract Law of China was enacted to replace the three 
separate statues and came into force in 1999. It is a fairly 
westernized statute that retains only a few of the ideological 
features of socialism. The new law protects the state interest in 
private transactions, but cautiously.  
 88. 120 Centrally owned SOEs account for 62% of the Chinese GDP and 
the total value of their fixed assets amounts to 120% of the Chinese GDP (Data 
available at http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1566/n258203/n259490 
/13878095.html). See Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We are the (National) 
Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 
STAN. L. REV. 697, 735 (2013). 
 89. State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC) was created in 2003 to exercise state’s shareholder rights within the 
SOEs. SASAC has the authority to appoint the management personnel, 
supervise major management decision-making and the use of state-owned assets. 
See国务院关于机构设置的通知（国发〔2008〕 11号） [State Council’s 
Notice on Agency Creation] (Guo Fa (2008) No.11). 
 90. See 隋彭生 《合同法要义》134页 中国政法大学出版社 （2003） 
[SUI PENG SHENG, ESSENCE OF CONTRACT LAW 134 (Press of China Univ. of 
Political Science and Law 2003)]. 
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It is the first post–1949 law that defines contract law as an area 
of civil law91 and contracting as a voluntary act.92 The law also 
confirms the equal status of the contracting parties and allows 
natural persons to enter into contracts.93 For the first time, the law 
would deal with the manner in which offers are made and 
accepted.94 
The tension between articles 52 and 54 of the 1999 law was 
pointed out in the Introduction. Article 54 provides that, as in 
Western jurisdictions, a party who was induced to enter a contract 
by fraud or duress may have it nullified or modified. Article 52 
provides that a contact is “null and void” if it “is concluded 
through the use of fraud or coercion by one party to damage the 
interests of the State” (§1); if it “harms the public interest” (§4); or 
if it “violates the compulsory provisions of the laws and 
administrative regulations (§5).” To summarize the general rules, if 
a contract was entered into through fraud and duress, it may be 
annulled or modified upon the aggrieved party’s request95 unless a 
state interest is involved; in that event the contract is void ab 
initio.96 As discussed earlier, if the state were deemed to have an 
interest under article 52 whenever a contract was made through 
fraud and duress, all such contracts would be absolutely null, and 
article 54 would be pointless. If the state were deemed to have an 
interest, and a contract to be null, only if fraud and duress violated 
some independent law or regulation, article 52(§1) would be 
pointless. If neither article is pointless, there must be some 
circumstances in which fraud and duress violate a state interest and 
some in which they do not. Article 54, as we have seen, protects 
party autonomy in a way that article 52 does not. The question then 
 91. See Contract Law art. 2. 
 92. See Contract Law art. 4. This is the Chinese expression of freedom of 
contract. 
 93. See id. at art. 2. 
 94. See generally, id. at arts.14–31.  
 95. See Contract Law art. 54. 
 96. See Contract Law art. 52 (§1). 
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is what protection party autonomy should receive in the present 
Chinese economy?  
Further, the situation can be complicated by the courts’ 
interpretations of G.P.C.L. article 58(§3), which, as mentioned in 
the Introduction, has rendered all civil juristic acts induced by 
fraud or duress absolutely null since 1986. Will the interpretation 
of this provision change the law on invalidity of contract formed 
through fraud or duress? 
B. Party Autonomy and the Validity of Contracts 
In practice, party autonomy is gaining more and more respect. 
Although article 52(§1) allows a court to declare a contract formed 
through fraud and duress to be null when a state interest is harmed, 
in practice, this power is hardly ever exercised on the court’s own 
initiative. Also, no judicial interpretation by the Supreme Court 
and no case accessible by research suggest what the limits of this 
power should be. Neither is there any existing judicial 
interpretation as to whether the interest of SOEs constitutes a state 
interest under article 52(§1).  
Several positions regarding the meaning of article 52(§1) have 
been taken by scholars. The first position is that the interest of 
SOEs is not deemed to be a state interest; only fraud and duress 
that violate criminal law qualify as fraud and duress that damage a 
state interest.97 The basis for this position is that Code of Criminal 
Law does penalize the manager of a state-owned enterprise when 
he or she was defrauded into entering a contract due to a neglect of 
duty, and the result was a heavy loss to the state.98  
The second position is that a state interest includes political, 
economic and security interests of the state but not that of state-
owned enterprises.99 Only when the content and purpose of the 
 97. See SUI PENG SHENG, supra note 90, at 134. 
 98. See Criminal Law of People’s Republic of China art. 167. 
 99. See MO ZHANG, supra note 23, at 170. 
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contract induced by fraud or duress violate the public interest of 
the society will the contract be regarded as null and void.100  
The third position is that “for the article 52(§1) to apply, the 
harmful effect of the contract on the innocent party whose interests 
represent those of the state must be so serious that no reasonable 
person in the position of the innocent party would elect to confirm 
the contract.”101  
The fourth position is that: 
[I]n reality, there are many circumstances where contracts 
are used for the purpose of misappropriating state assets 
and therefore infringing upon state interest. However, due 
to victim’s fear of being held liable or insensitivity to the 
loss of state assets, heavy loss of state assets might be 
resulted. If such contracts are not categorized as void per 
se, it is not sufficient to protect state assets.102 
A consequence of the first two positions is that the “state 
interest” in question is only a term interchangeable with “public 
interest,” and that article 52(§1) does nothing more than rephrasing 
article 52(§4). The third and fourth positions, however, seem to 
provide an alternative by claiming that the state interest is that of 
parties who represent the state and manage the state assets. 
Accordingly, a state interest under article 52(§1) means the interest 
of state-owned enterprises other than the public in general. 
To solve this puzzle, I propose a three-step analysis. The first 
step is to determine whether there is a state interest in a private 
transaction entered into by a state-owned enterprise despite the 
leading opinion that there is not. If there is a state interest, the 
second step is to determine when that interest can be harmed by act 
of fraud or duress in the formation of a contract. The third step is 
 100. 梁慧星 《民法总论》179页 法律出版社 [HUIXING LIANG, GENERAL 
THEORIES OF CIVIL LAW 179 (3d ed., Law Press 2007)]. 
 101. See BING LING, CONTRACT LAW IN CHINA 182, (Sweet & Maxwell Asia 
2002). 
 102. 胡康生 《中华人民共和国合同法释义》79，80页 法律出版社 
（1999）[HU KANGSHENG, INTERPRETATIONS OF CHINESE CONTRACT LAW 79–
80 (Law Press 1999)]. 
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to determine when such a state interest should be considered 
“harmed” and under what circumstances the harm should be 
remedied by declaring that the contract is null. Is there state 
interest existing in private transactions that can be threatened by 
fraud and duress? 
1. Is there a State Interest in Private Transactions?  
Yes, there is a state interest in private transactions when at least 
one contracting party is a state-owned enterprise. There is a state 
interest because the state is a shareholder of a business enterprise. 
It used to be the case, as described earlier in this article, that the 
state was the sole owner of all businesses. Government ownership 
was the only legitimate ownership until the policy of reform and 
openness. Now, there is an increasing number of privately-owned 
enterprises, and in the stock market, there are state-owned 
companies listed in which less than a majority of the shares are 
tradable to prevent the state assets from going into the private 
sector. As long as there is financial investment from government, 
the investments in these companies constitutes state assets, which 
are threatened by fraud and duress.  
Yet the consequence is not that the state should always 
intervene to protect its interests. Although the state has an interest 
in protecting its assets, as a market participant, the state must 
respect the autonomy of the parties in entering into a contract. The 
state interest might be protected by interfering with party 
autonomy. Yet, if the state nullifies every contract in which it has 
an interest, the new recognition of contractual autonomy and 
freedom of contract by 1999 Contract Law will again disappear on 
Chinese soil since the state will be making the decision on behalf 
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2. What Interest is Article 52(§1) Protecting that can be 
Harmed by Fraud and Duress in Contract Formation?  
In my opinion, the only interest of the state that needs to be 
protected from fraud and duress in a contractual transaction is the 
SOEs’ interest, which represents the state’s pure financial interest 
rather than public interest.  
Public interest is a universal ground for nullity of contracts. 
However, this interest doesn’t need protection from article 52(§1). 
When the public interest is harmed, the contract can easily be 
nullified on the ground of illegality, violation of public policy or 
morality as suggested by laws in virtually all other jurisdictions. 
These grounds are also available in §2–5 of article 52. According 
to these subsections, a contract will be declared null, if the contract 
is a sham transaction that harms the public interest or violates the 
mandatory laws. In any event, if the state interest in question falls 
within the state’s political, economic, or security interest—leaving 
aside its interest in state-owned enterprises—such an interest will 
be protected by article 52(§4) and (§5) rather than article 52(§1). 
In addition, in the context of socialist market economy, 
separation of SOEs from government has been regarded as one of 
the core elements of SOE reform. Accordingly, the public policy 
should be to treat SOEs equally as a market participant and to 
reduce SOEs’ hidden advantages as much as possible. The public 
policy here should be to prevent state from acting at the same time 
both as a referee and a player. The financial interest of the SOE 
therefore shall not be regarded as equivalent to a state or public 
interest.  
Admittedly, the Criminal Code penalizes the managers of state-
owned enterprises for neglect of their duties if they allow 
themselves to be defrauded into making contracts that result in 
“heavy losses of the state interest.”103 It does not penalize making 
a contract with a state-owned enterprise by the use of fraud. 
 103. See Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China art. 167. 
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Consequently, defrauding a state-owned enterprise is not a 
violation of law that will make a contract null and void under 
article 52(§5). There is no reason why, if the manager is penalized 
for bad business judgment and gross negligence, the contract itself 
should automatically become null. Consequently, in this context, 
fraud and duress do not in themselves qualify as violations of 
criminal law.104 Moreover, contract law, being part of the civil law, 
is not the appropriate forum to protect the state interest from 
criminal conduct or conduct that violates the public interest. 
On the other hand, as the sole or majority shareholder of the 
SOEs, the state has had a long standing financial interest in 
contracts made by state-owned enterprises ever since the time of 
the planned economy.  
To understand what state interest in China can be harmed by 
fraud and duress, it is better to start by asking the question “why 
don’t Western civil laws protect the state interest from fraud and 
duress and make such contracts null and void?” The answer is that, 
if fraud or duress violates law and public policy, the contract will 
automatically be null and void. Nevertheless, a court will sit on its 
hands when the only interest harmed is the private interest of a 
private party. The reason is that without the existence or with very 
limited existence of the state-owned companies, the state 
presumptively has no or little interest in private transactions unless 
law is violated or public order is offended. In China, given the 
socialist features of its economic system, the state does have an 
ownership interest in the private contract transactions entered by 
state-owned enterprises. There will be no difference in each civil 
law jurisdiction’s treatment towards fraud or duress that violates 
criminal law or other statutory provisions, or when an absolute 
simulation or a sham transaction takes place— such contracts will 
be deemed null and void. The only interest China has that the 
 104. See SUI PENG SHENG, supra note 90, at 134. 
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capitalist counterparts do not have is the state’s pure financial 
interest in SOEs’ interest in private transactions.  
This enlarged power of the state to intervene to annul private 
contracts can be traced back to article 30 of 1922 Civil Code of 
R.S.F.S.R., which states: “A civil juristic act made for a purpose 
contrary to law, or in fraud of law, as well as a transaction directed 
to the obvious prejudice of the State, shall be invalid.” Though this 
provision is not exactly the same as article 52(§1), they both annul 
contracts to protect the same interest – the financial interest of the 
state and SOEs. Under this Soviet Civil Code article, an otherwise 
legal contract that is directed to the obvious prejudice of the state is 
absolutely null. The Soviet case law and jurisprudence tend to 
suggest that the range of contracts that were deemed to be directed 
to the obvious prejudice of the state covers was larger than those 
covered by article 52(§1).  
Most scholars have agreed that it was a device to guard against 
the undesirable growth of private business and that it was enacted 
in conformity with Lenin’s instruction “to enlarge the interference 
of the State with the relations pertaining to private law and to 
enlarge the right of the government to annul, if necessary, private 
contracts.”105 Another scholar, T.E. Novitskaya , refers to this 
device as “an effective weapon in the hands of the Soviet 
state.”106The right of the state to interfere with any contracts made 
in any area of civil law created a tool to avoid consequences 
disadvantageous for the socialist economy. In a Russian Supreme 
Court case, the court annulled sales contracts solely because SOEs 
had an interest in the objects for sale.107 Such annulments were 
based on the “socially announced purpose of use” of the object.108 
In another case the high court annulled a lease and thereby 
interfered with a party’s property right because the property right is 
 105. See GSOVSKI, supra note 24, at 426. 
 106. T.E. NOVITSKAYA, GRAZHDANSKIY KODEKS R.S.F.S.R. 1922 
[R.S.F.S.R. Civil Code of 1922] 86 (Moscow State Univ., Moscow 2002).  
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
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not absolute under the civil code, and the economic interest of the 
SOE prevailed over the property right.109 It can be inferred that had 
the SOE been defrauded or under duress in contract formation, the 
Soviet courts would have annulled the contract to protect the 
financial interests of the SOE. Also, what makes this device more 
powerful than article 52(§1) is the legal sanction: when a contract 
is annulled under article 30, damages for unjust enrichment will be 
collected by the state rather than the innocent party.110 
3. The Judicial Responses  
Chinese courts are confused as to what the state interest refers 
to and do not fully understand the distinction between absolute 
nullity and relative nullity. 
My observations are based on the study of 122 cases decided 
under article 52.  
Courts appear to be careful about declaring a contract to be 
absolutely null and certainly have not done so without a request 
from the innocent party. Courts seem to go by the checklist under 
article 52. They declare the contract valid if none of the 
circumstances under article 52 apply and no party requested that 
the contract be rescinded. 
Also in the majority of cases decided under article 52, contracts 
were annulled under either article 52(§4) or article 52(§5) for 
violation of the public interest or of a mandatory law. It is 
noteworthy that in most of the cases that cited article 52(§4), the 
courts never cited article 52(§1) or article 52(§2) at the same time, 
where both provisions mention state interest. It is clear that in the 
opinion of many courts, the state interest in question is not the 
public interest but rather something else. There is a significant 
number of cases where courts cited article 52(§1)–(§5) as authority 
 109. Id. at 87. 
 110. See R.S.F.S.R. Civil Code art. 147. 
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to nullify a contract without reference to a specific subsection or 
without providing any explanation.  
Among these cases, only a few were decided under article 
52(§1) and article 52(§2) where the state interest is identified. Is 
the state interest under article 52(§2) the same as the state interest 
under article 52(§1)? Given the logical structure of the article, 
most likely the state interests in both these provisions refer to the 
same thing – the SOEs’ interest. The only difference between the 
two provisions is that when only one party committed the wrong in 
contract formation, article 52(§1) is applicable to annul the 
contract; when both parties collectively committed the wrong, 
article 52(§2) is applicable. Also the level of state interference will 
be upgraded when both parties are at fault: the state will annul the 
contract when either state interest, collective interest (meaning the 
rural villages’ interest) or a third party’s interest, is harmed.  
The cases show that several Chinese courts do distinguish state 
interest from public interest and acknowledge that the state interest 
was really the SOEs’ financial interest. One district court openly 
admitted that whenever an SOE’s interest is harmed, the state 
interest is therefore harmed.111 In this case where the court cited 
article 52(§2), the plaintiffs were state-owned pharmaceutical 
companies that entered into an agreement with two advertising 
firms after the two firms prevailed in the bidding process.112 
However, the plaintiff’s employees had leaked the confidential 
information in the course of the bidding process to help the 
defendants succeed. The court, in its opinion, stated that “the 
employees of the two plaintiffs and two defendants committed 
malicious collusion and therefore harmed the two plaintiffs’ 
interests. Given the fact that the two plaintiffs are state-owned 
enterprises, when their interests are harmed, the state interest is 
harmed.” In another case decided under article 52(§1), where a 
 111. San X Pharmaceutical JSC v. Ya Advertising LLC. 2010, Shen Luo Min 
Er Chu Zi No. 3X4X (citation partially omitted). 
 112. Id. 
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state-owned pharmaceutical company was defrauded by another 
pharmaceutical company, the court annulled the contract, citing 
article 52(§1) as the only authority, rather than using article 54.113 
Here, the plaintiff and appellant, a state-owned company, had sued 
in damages for non-performance, making no claim for dissolution. 
The claim was dismissed but the court declared the contract null on 
the basis of article 52(§1), though without explaining what the 
state interest was. The only possible state interest at stake here was 
the SOE’s financial interest. It is obvious that, according to both 
the trial court and appellate court, the SOE didn’t have the option 
to uphold the contract and sue in damages for non-performance 
even though it might be more beneficial for the state and the SOE 
to maintain the contract and obtain expectation damages. In a third 
case, it was asserted that a malicious collusion took place between 
the immediate past manager and legal representative of a state-
owned gallery, the Gallery of Shenyang Municipality, and a 
pharmacy that had been a lessee leasing space within the 
Gallery.114 It turned out that the manager kept the official stamp 
after he left office and produced a lease that was a counterfeit 
which renewed the lease for three years and lowered the rent from 
1.15 million RMB to 0.8 million RMB.115 The Gallery asked to 
have the contract annulled because “the conspiracy resulted in the 
loss of a state-owned enterprise.”116 The trial court upheld the 
validity of the contract based on the doctrine of apparent 
agency.117 The appellate court sided with the Gallery and annulled 
the contract citing article 52(§2) because “the interest of Gallery of 
Shengyang Municipality is harmed.”118 No reasoning or 
 113. Henan Middle Pharmaceutical Company v. Dong Xueling & Hubei 
Hualong Pharmaceutical Company 2011, 郑民二终字第1327号 [Zheng Min Er 
Zhong Zi No.1327].  
 114. Shenyang Gallery v. Shenyang Taiyuan Street Pharmacy 2005, 沈民 
（2）房终字第847号 [2005 Shen Min (2) Fang Zhong Zi No.847]. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
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explanation was given to identify one of the three interests listed in 
article 52(§2). There was no collective or third party interest 
involved, thus leaving only one logical explanation: the court must 
have been of opinion that the Gallery, as an SOE, represented the 
state interest. Therefore, it is fair to say that these courts are at least 
of the opinion that the state interest protected by article 52 is 
identical to the state-owned enterprise’s interest.  
The courts, however, are not unanimous. In another case, the 
court did not nullify the contract even though the state-owned 
hospital was defrauded in a licensing agreement for a patent and 
had claimed rescission of the contract based on article 52(§1).119 
The hospital could no longer request nullification on the basis of 
article 54, due to the one-year prescription. Nullity remained 
possible on the basis of article 52(§1) where contracts that are 
absolutely null are imprescriptible according to a recently 
published Supreme Court case.120 The court’s only line of 
reasoning was that “a state-owned enterprise’s interest is not the 
equivalent of state interest” and therefore article 52(§1) was not 
applicable.121 It is worth mentioning that victims of fraud or duress 
try to use article 52(§1) as a last resort to nullify a contract when 
the one-year prescriptive period for annullable contracts runs out 
and the victims happen to be SOEs.122 
4. When is the State Interest Harmed, and under what 
Circumstances shall the Article 52(§1) Power be Exercised?  
My answer to the third question is that the state or a third party 
can only step in to have a court declare a contract formed under 
fraud or duress to be null when the situation is so deleterious that 
 119. Tao Zhenhai v. Liaohe Oil Field Center Hospital 2006, 沈民四知初字
第65号 [2006 Shen Min Si Zhi Chu Zi No.65]. 
 120. Guangxi BeiSheng Co. Ltd v. Beihai Weihao Real Estate Development 
Co. Ltd 2005, 民一终字第104号 [2005 Min Yi Zhong Zi] (Published in May, 
2013). 
 121. See supra note 119. 
 122. See Contract Law art. 54. 
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the failure of the state-owned enterprise to seek restitution 
constitutes a neglect of duty. Such strings must be attached to 
prevent the state from abusing its power, and thereby harm the 
safety of transactions. In addition, it is not always in the state’s 
own financial interest to rescind a contract made under fraud or 
duress.  
If the state tried to seek annulment of every contract induced 
by fraud or duress on behalf of the state-owned enterprises, the 
state-owned enterprises would lose their autonomy as market 
players to make a business decision in their best interest. State-
owned enterprises would then be pure government agencies rather 
than business entities. After all, since a government-led market 
economy has been established in China, private transactions are no 
longer mere forms in which state supplies are operated. State-
owned enterprises now have independent financial status and 
independent management. Such intrusion, if allowed, would 
greatly discourage commercial transactions because people would 
be more concerned in making contracts where a third party or the 
state can step in and declare it null without their consent.  
Also, as previously described, it might be in the state’s 
economic interest to enforce a contract even though it was made by 
means of fraud or duress. The reasons might be that expectation 
damages for non-performance are greater than reliance damages 
that may be granted in addition to nullity, or that some market 
change made it beneficial to enforce such a contract. Also, the 
object of the contract might simply be of great subjective value to 
the state-owned enterprise, and therefore creates a legitimate 
reason for the company to enforce it regardless of fraud or duress.  
Therefore, in my opinion, the enlarged state power to annul 
contracts can only be exercised when there is neglect in the 
performance of a duty and that neglect is so severe that no 
reasonable businessman would choose to enforce the contract after 
knowing of the fraud or being released from duress.  
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Further, state intervention can be justified by the lack of a 
sufficiently free and competitive market and the lack of a sufficient 
information indicator to evaluate the SOE performance.  
We discussed the aggrieved party’s incentive to act in its best 
interest in evaluating the financial consequences of nullification. 
Even though reforms have been carried out to invigorate SOEs, the 
state-owned enterprises are not sufficiently business-driven. The 
absence of effective shareholding and corporate governance results 
in a lack of management accountability. Managers in state-owned 
enterprises are more like government employees than businessmen 
and are short of personal incentive and financial stake in running 
the business. Throughout the SOE reforms around the world, it has 
been observed that “bureaucrats typically perform poorly in 
business, not because they are incompetent, but because they face 
contradictory goals and perverse incentives that can distract and 
discourage even very able and dedicated public servants.”123 
 In China, SOE managers receive salaries that are comparable 
to government employees with similar bureaucratic ranks, and 
directors and officers can be laterally transferred to other 
government agencies in the event the SOE goes bankrupt. 
Therefore, unlike privately-owned businesses, profit maximization 
is never the top priority of these government-employed 
businessmen who are tasked to carry out state policies and held 
accountable only to the state. Since these quasi state-officials are 
not nearly as motivated as private entrepreneurs, since they are not 
accountable to shareholders for their grossly negligent business 
decisions, one may expect poor judgment when it comes to decide 
whether a contract should be nullified.124  
Also, given the bad experience China had had during the 
economic reform in giving SOE managers too much autonomy and 
 123. See WORLD BANK, supra note 71, at 3. 
 124. 浙江省金华县人民法院（1992）白民初字第57号 [Zhe Bai Min Chu 
Zi No. 57 (1992)] 
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incentive125 and the incentive incompatibility that the reform fails 
to cure with both the policy induced burden and absence of a 
competitive market, this situation is unlikely to improve in the 
foreseeable future. Despite the introduction of a market economy, 
the state, as the owner of the SOEs, has its own policy agenda that 
needs to be carried out by SOEs, which is often incompatible with 
normal business incentives. For example, SOEs often have to carry 
out policy burdens such as the “policy-induced over-staffing” in 
order to assist the state in “resettling the redundant workers”.126 
Also, as the main forces in pursuing the state economic objectives, 
SOEs still don’t have the complete autonomy in choosing their 
production direction.127 Price distortion still exists to serve the 
state development strategies.128 Unlike in the West, profit alone 
usually does not accurately reflect the efficiency and diligence of 
the management. It is possible that a poorly managed enterprise 
can still generate significant profits due to the lack of competition 
and superficial entry barriers created by government. Under such 
circumstances, if the state totally keeps its hands off SOE 
management decision making, it is possible for the manager to 
 125. Jian Chen, in his book Corporate Governance in China, described one 
of the lessons:  
Contract responsibility systems were introduced in most large and 
medium-sized state industrial enterprises during 1986–1997. The 
system was officially intended to place government ownership at arm’s 
length to enterprise management, so allowing more decision making 
space (business autonomy) to the latter. In the contract, the firm hands 
over an agreed amount of annual profit and tax for which they have 
contracted. It was permitted to retain a proportion of any surplus it 
achieved above the contract level. Also, the firm guaranteed to invest to 
increase asset value and to develop technology by an agreed amount, 
using retained profit during the contract period. But substantial 
collusion soon emerged between the directors, and the heads of the 
supervising government departments, leading to widespread corruption. 
The directors found that it was easier or quicker to reward themselves 
by transferring the firm’s assets to their own firms. The lesson was that 
it was not feasible to relinquish control to the firm’s managers in 
attempt to improve performance.  
See JIAN CHEN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 38–39 (Routledge 2009). 
 126. See JUSTIN YIFU LIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 114. 
 127. See id. at 119–120. 
 128. See id. at 145. 
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neglect the management duty to effectively protect state-owned 
assets and the SOE’s financial interest without being noticed by the 
state, if the state, as the majority shareholder, only looks at the 
usual information indicators as in the West.  
These endogenous features inherent in Chinese economy 
warrant the state’s supervisory role over the SOEs. In response to 
the incentive incompatibility, information asymmetry, and liability 
disproportionality discussed above, it is legitimate for the state to 
nullify otherwise annullable contracts when affording the SOE 
management the option to confirm a contract that would harm the 
state’s interest in the SOE. Nevertheless, a court cannot rescind an 
annullable contract on its own initiative when neither party is an 
SOE. If both parties are private companies, then no such state 
interest will be involved. The state should not intervene, no matter 
how serious the consequence of fraud or duress is, and how big a 
financial loss the innocent party suffers.  
Also, the state should not be able to rescind an annullable 
contract where the only aggrieved party is an SOE but there is a 
reasonable business choice not to rescind it. This may be in order 
to benefit from a market change or to obtain greater damages, or 
because the contract has a reasonable subjective value to the 
aggrieved party.  
C. Further Confusions Caused by Article 58(§3) of the G.P.C.L.  
As mentioned above, G.P.C.L. article 58(§3) adds to the 
complexity of the puzzle this article tries to resolve.  
Though the G.P.C.L. assume their status as the highest law in 
the realm of civil law, as a general law, it is trumped by special 
laws such as contract law statutes, should any conflict exist. The 
GPLC govern civil juristic acts, of which contracts are a category. 
Every time a contract is induced by fraud or duress, a potential 
conflict between the Contract Law and the G.P.C.L. arises. 
Presumably, this outdated law should either be no longer 
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applicable or only applicable to civil juristic acts other than 
contract, in application of the civilian principle that special rules 
take precedence over general rules (specialia generalibus 
derogant). This would keep article 58(§3) away from further 
confusing the conflict between article 52 and article 54 of the 
Contract Law. However, an examination of 35 cases decided under 
article 58 in the past 23 years reveals a different story. It appears 
that when an SOE is harmed by a civil juristic act induced by fraud 
or duress, article 58(§3) merely extends the article 52(§1) 
protection of SOEs’ financial interest afforded to the civil juristic 
acts by imposing the absolute nullity of civil juristic acts when 
induced by fraud or duress. Also, a court might use article 58(§3) 
to enlarge its contract nullification power and infringe the 
autonomy established by article 54 of the Contract Law, by 
considering the contract simply as a civil juristic act rather than 
characterizing it as a contract.  
For contracts entered into between 1986 and 1999, when 
nullifying economic contracts formed under fraud or duress, courts 
usually cited both G.P.C.L. article 58 and E.C.L. article 7.129 This 
was probably because contracting was deemed both a civil juristic 
act and an economic contract. When nullifying contracts between 
individuals where the contracts did not fall within the regime of the 
E.C.L., courts only cited G.P.C.L. article 58.130 In a case decided 
in 1992, a sale of an apartment between two individuals was 
nullified because of a fraudulent misrepresentation by the 
defendant.131 The act of sale was deemed a civil juristic act rather 
than a contract and therefore was annulled under G.P.C.L. article 
58(§3) rather than under the special contract law. The court did not 
explain why this sale was not a contract. Most probably, because 
only juristic persons or business entities were allowed to enter into 
 129. See (1992) 渝经上字第377号 [Yu Jing Shang Zi No.377 (1992)]. 
 130. This is contrary to the traditional view that contracts between 
individuals were not regulated before 1999.  
 131. 浙江省金华县人民法院（1992）白民初字第57号 [Zhe Bai Min Chu 
Zi No. 57 (1992)]. 
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economic contracts and because the sale did not comply with rigid 
form requirements under the E.C.L.132, the E.C.L. was not 
applicable to the case.  
For contracts entered into from 1999 to present, in theory, 
courts are supposed to apply article 58 (§3) to nullify civil juristic 
acts that are not regarded as contracts.133 In such cases, these 
juristic acts induced by fraud or duress are absolutely null, and 
therefore can be nullified on the court’s own initiative. For 
example, in a 2005 Supreme Court case, a company in the business 
of international trade deceived a state-owned bank into issuing 
letters of credit through a series of misrepresentations when 
applying for the letters.134 The court held that the issuance of such 
letters of credits was null because they were civil juristic acts that 
fall within the scope of article 58(§3).135 Article 58(§3) is used as 
an extension of the article 52(1) power into the state-owned bank’s 
issuance of letters of credit. 
Also, in several private loan disputes cases, courts unanimously 
treated the signing of an informal acknowledgement of debts 
(“IOU”) under the threat of physical violence136 and a payment by 
the wife of the alleged debt of the husband when the wife was 
defrauded by a falsified IOU137 as absolutely null juristic acts. 
These annulments were based solely on article 58(§3). 
However, courts sometimes use article 58(§3) as a vehicle to 
annul contracts for fraud or duress, without mentioning article 52 
 132. For example, under the E.C.L. art. 3, an economic contract should be in 
writing. Article 12 lists a series of main provisions that should be included in an 
economic contract.  
 133. For example, when a person made a will under duress, to nullify the 
will, the court has to apply art. 58(§3) of the G.P.C.L. rather than art. 54 of the 
Contract Law. 
 134. See（2005）民四终字第21号 [Min Si Zhong Zi No.21(2005)]. 
 135. Id. In the West, a letter of credit is regarded as a contract. However, in 
China, courts are not certain whether the letter shall be defined as a contract. In 
this case, the court seemed to be convinced that the letter of credit was a civil 
juristic act that was not a contract.  
 136. See (2009) 浙台商终字第98号 [Zhe Tai Shang Zhong Zi No.98 
(2009)]. 
 137. See (2008) 豫驻民三终字第417号 [Yu Zhu Min San No.417 (2005)]. 
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or article 54 of the Contract Law, thus preferring the general law to 
the special law. This preference is generally a distinction without a 
difference since the victim usually requested the court to nullify 
the transaction anyway. Nevertheless, sometimes courts tend to 
nullify contracts on their own initiative when the victim of fraud or 
duress might in theory choose to perform the contract regardless of 
relative nullity.  
In a case decided in 2009, the plaintiff filed suit to have the 
court annul a settlement agreement signed by him under duress.138 
In this case, the plaintiff and defendant were fathers of a newly-
wed couple who were having disputes over each other’s share of 
the wedding expenses.139 The defendant brought over 40 relatives 
and hooligans to the plaintiff’s house. The group not only beat the 
plaintiff but also forced him to sign a settlement agreement. 
Without addressing the possibility that this agreement may be 
considered a contract, the court treated it as an absolutely null civil 
juristic act, solely based on the application of article 58(§3).140 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In contrast with Western civil law systems in which contract 
law theories are based on freedom of contract and the expression 
of the will, the post–1949 Chinese contract law is based on a 
system in which government ownership of the economy dominates 
and the market is not yet free and competitive. Upon China’s 
adoption of a market economy, the role of contract has been slowly 
and reluctantly moving from public economic law, which 
emphasizes state regulatory control, to private civil law, which 
requires contractual autonomy and more limited state interference. 
The SOE reform that has allowed SOEs more autonomy, but has 
not yet provided the solution to cure the incentive incompatibility, 
information asymmetry, and liability disproportionality between 
 138. See (2009)甘民初字第2902号 [Gan Min Chu Zi No. 2902 (2009)]. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
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the state and SOEs. Under these circumstances, freedom of 
contract, though adopted by the Chinese Contract Law, will be 
abused by SOEs at the expense of the state if made applicable to 
them without additional strings. The interference with freedom of 
contract, as exemplified by Contract Law article 52(§1), is a 
reasonable solution to prevent the abuse. Nevertheless, such a state 
intrusion must be restricted and narrowly tailored to permit the 
rescission of contracts only when rescission was not sought due to 
a neglect of a duty by those in charge of state-owned enterprises. 
Despite my arguments, it remains uncertain, as we have seen 
from the various cases, how the Chinese courts interpret this state 
interest in practice. Foreign corporations, when conducting 
business in China and contracting with Chinese state-owned 
enterprises, should know that the validity of their contracts may 
depend on such an extensive state power when state interest is at 
stake. The scope of this power might be as narrow as this article 
proposes: it might extend to the state-owned enterprises’ interest 
under extreme circumstances. Yet, it might also be broadly applied 
to protect SOEs’ financial interests under ordinary circumstances 
and SOEs might not be afforded the option to keep the contract 
when it was induced by fraud or duress. Another possibility is that 
article 52(§1) will be applied to protect other state interests. In that 
event, however, article 52(§1) will merely be a paraphrase of the 
protection of public interest under article 52(§4), as in all the 
Western legal systems in which violation of public order is a 
ground for absolute nullity of contract.  
 
 
